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I. INTRODUCTION
The United Nations adopted the Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime (hereinafter "CATOC") on November 15, 2000.' CA-
TOC requires signatory countries to criminalize either conspiracy,
2participation in an organized criminal group, or both these activities.
Ratification of the convention has typically been uneventful 3 with the
• J.D. University of Michigan Law School, December 2007. There are few English-
language materials on Japan's proposed criminal conspiracy law. Thus, many materials cited
in this Note are Japanese-language materials. Where possible, the author has cited to an Eng-
lish source, in some cases even where a more authoritative Japanese-language source may be
available. Unless otherwise noted, translations are the author's. The author would like to thank
Professor Mark West, Nippon Life Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law
School, for research and writing suggestions, and Daisuke Mure, University of Michigan
LL.M., for assistance in interpreting Japanese law. Any errors or omissions are the responsibil-
ity of the author alone.
1. G.A. Res. 55/25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Nov. 15, 2000) [hereinafter CATOC].
2. See id. at art. 5.
3. Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime, Second session, Vienna, Austria, Oct. 10-21 2005, Review of the implemen-
tation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, para. 17-21,
U.N. Doc. CTOC/COP/2005/2/Rev.1 (Aug. 9, 2006) [hereinafter Review of the implementa-
tion] (noting that apparently "the offen[s]e of agreeing to commit a serious crime, inspired
from the common law conspiracy model, has in fact been widely incorporated into national
legislation across the board of legal traditions.").
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vast majority of signatory countries meeting this requirement with preex-
isting law.4
Japan is one of several CATOC signatory countries' that has no
criminal conspiracy law,6 nor is participation in an organized criminal
group a crime in Japan. The attempt to criminalize conspiracy in Japan
has stalled in the face of widespread protest, delaying Japan's ratification
of CATOC.1 The debate as to whether and how to criminalize conspiracy
in Japan provides a unique opportunity to analyze criminal conspiracy
liability in modem society. This Note describes proposals in Japan to
create a criminal conspiracy law, Japan's existing criminal law related to
criminal conspiracy, and the criticism levied in Japan against a conspir-
acy law.
Part II of this Note describes CATOC's group criminality require-
ment. Part III outlines the provisions of several versions of Japan's
conspiracy bill and compares these provisions to common-law conspir-
acy. Part IV analyzes Japan's conspiracy law by examining both
substantive and procedural laws in Japan related to criminal conspiracy,
as well as criticism within Japan of the conspiracy bills.
II. THE GROUP CRIMINALITY REQUIREMENT OF THE
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME
CATOC is a comprehensive document, although it is CATOC's con-
spiracy provision that is controversial in Japan.9 CATOC has been
praised as an important milestone in the general development of intema-
4. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2784 (2006); MODEL PENAL CODE §
5.03 (1962); see also SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND
ITS PROCESSES 671, 730-31, 746 (7th ed. 2001); KRIANGSAK KITTICHAISAREE, INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 248-49 (2001) (international war crimes tribunals have recognized
conspiracy to commit genocide and common plan to wage aggressive war).
5. Review of the implementation, supra note 3, at para. 17, 21 (noting that participa-
tion in an organized criminal group was not a crime in Iceland, Thailand, Myanmar, and that
organizing/facilitating a serious crime involving an organized criminal group was not a crime
in Angola, El Salvador, Iceland, Madagascar, and Myanmar).
6. See generally Kobayakawa Yoshinori, Eibeih5 no konsupirashi to "soshikiteki han-
zai no kydbbzai:" Kydbd no nintei [Anglo-American Conspiracy and "The Group Offense of
Conspiracy:" Recognition of Conspiracy], HORITSU JIH6, Sept. 2006, 36 (Japan).
7. In some cases members of criminal groups can face civil liability. See Boryoku-
danin ni yoru futona koi no boshi nado ni kan suru horitsu [Anti-Organized Crime Act], Law
No. 77 of 1991; Curtis J. Mulhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An
Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 41, 72-73
(2000).
8. For a more in-depth discussion, see Ito Kensuke, Kokusai soshiki hanzai to kydb6-
zai [International Group Criminality and Conspiracy], JURISTO (Nov. 15, 2006) (Japan).
9. CATOC, supra note 1, Annex I., art. 5.
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tional criminal law.'° The convention requires signatory states to crimi-
nalize money laundering," to criminalize corruption,' and to allow
seizure of criminal assets.'3
CATOC also requires all signatory countries to criminalize certain
group criminal activities. The CATOC approach to group criminality is
a practical combination of two commonly-used approaches to criminal-
izing group activity. '" Article five, paragraph one, contains the
requirement to criminalize "participation in an organized criminal
group":
1. Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other meas-
ures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offenses,
when committed intentionally:
(a) Either or both of the following as criminal offenses dis-
tinct from those involving the attempt or completion of
the criminal activity:
(i) Agreeing with one or more other persons to commit a
serious crime for a purpose relating directly or indi-
rectly to the obtaining of a financial or other material
benefit and, where required by domestic law, involv-
ing an act undertaken by one of the participants in
furtherance of the agreement or involving an organ-
ized criminal group;
(ii) Conduct by a person who, with knowledge of either
the aim and general criminal activity of an organized
criminal group or its intention to commit the crimes
in question, takes an active part in:
a. Criminal activities of the organized criminal
group;
b. Other activities of the organized criminal group
in the knowledge that his or her participation will
10. Gerhard Kemp, The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime: A Milestone in International Criminal Law, 14 S. AFR. J. CRIM. JUST. 152, 166 (2001).
11. CATOC, supra note 1, Annex I, art. 6.
12. CATOC, supra note 1, at Annex I, art. 8.
13. CATOC, supra note 1, at Annex I, art. 13.
14. See Roger S. Clark, The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Crime,
50 WAYNE L. REV. 161, 168 (2004) (summarizing the group criminality requirements of
CATOC).
15. Id. at 170.
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contribute to the achievement of the above-
described criminal aim.
6
CATOC requires creation of a substantive crime distinct from the
"attempt or completion" of criminal activity.'7 Liability appears to be
cumulative with the underlying offense. 8 A country may adopt "either or
both" of two criminal offenses.' 9 The first option is recorded in section
(a)(i), essentially the common law crime of conspiracy.0 Section (a)(ii)
contains the second option, the equivalent of the civil law crime of
criminal association.2 The criminal association offense has been charac-
terized as a form of enterprise liability. 2 The knowledge, intent, aim,
purpose, or agreement requirements in these sections may be inferred
from objective facts. 3
In some ways, CATOC group criminal liability is carefully limited. 24
Any offense must be committed "intentionally." The conspiracy-like
offense is limited to agreements to commit a "serious crime," which is
defined as "an offen[s]e punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty
of at least four years or a more serious penalty.' 26 Also, "where required
by domestic law," additional limitations may be imposed on the conspir-
acy offense. 27 The offense may be limited by requiring that an act be
committed in furtherance of the conspiracy.' Also, the offense may be
limited to only agreements "involving an organized criminal group. 29
An "organized criminal group" is defined by the convention as "a
structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time
and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious
crimes or offen[s]es . . . in order to obtain . . . material benefit."30 A
"structured group" is further defined as a group "that is not randomly
formed for the immediate commission of an offen[s]e and that does not
need to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its
16. CATOC, supra note 1, Annex I, art. 5.
17. CATOC, supra note 1, at art. 5(1)(a).
18. Clark, supra note 14, at 171 n.40.
19. CATOC, supra note 1, art. 5(l)(a).
20. Clark, supra note 14, at 170.
21. Clark, supra note 14, at 172.
22. Clark, supra note 14, at 172 n.44.
23. CATOC, supra note 1, art. 5(2).
24. Clark, supra note 14, at 171 n.42.
25. CATOC, supra note 1, art. 5(1).
26. CATOC, supra note 1, at art. 2(b). The definition of serious crime is similar to the
Council of Europe definition. Kemp, supra note 10, at 155-56.
27. CATOC, supra note 1, art. 5(l)(a).
28. CATOC, supra note 1, at art. 5(1)(a)(i); Clark, supra note 14, at 171 ("This is a
close relative of the common law 'overt act' requirement.").
29. CATOC, supra note 1, art. 5(1)(a)(i).
30. CATOC, supra note 1, at art. 2(a).
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membership or a developed structure."3' These nested definitions limit
the offense to only "organized" and "structured" groups.32
The CATOC criminal association offense is also limited. The offense
must be committed "with knowledge of either the aim and general
criminal activity of an organized criminal group or its intention to com-
mit the crime in question."33 Also, the accused must take "an active part
in" the "criminal activities" of an organized criminal group.34 Alterna-
tively, if the accused has "knowledge that his or her participation will
contribute to the achievement of' the criminal aim of the group, the ac-
tivities in which the accused takes an active part may be other,
31presumably non-criminal, activities of the organized criminal group.
Thus, even otherwise lawful conduct may result in liability if done
knowingly.36 However, any criminal association offense must be inten-
tionally and knowingly committed, and there must be an overt act.37
CATOC requires signatory countries to implement its provisions, and
thus countries must criminalize one or both of the above offenses.38 Arti-
cle five requires countries to "adopt such legislative and other measures
as may be necessary to establish [group] criminal offen[s]es.' ' 39 Also, the
convention generally requires each state to "take the necessary measures,
including legislative and administrative measures, in accordance with
fundamental principles of its domestic law, to ensure implementation of
its obligations under this Convention."40 Additionally, the group criminal
offenses must be "established in the domestic law of each State Party
independently of the transnational nature or the involvement of an organ-
ized criminal group... except to the extent article five ... would require
the involvement of an organized criminal group. ' 4' Thus, a state may not
31. CATOC, supra note 1, at art. 5(2)(c).
32. Clark, supra note 14, at 171 n.42.
33. CATOC, supra note 1, art. 5(1)(a)(ii); Clark, supra note 14, at 172 (characterizing
the criminal association offense as "knowingly associat[ing] with and tak[ing] an 'active part'
in an organized criminal group").
34. CATOC, supra note 1, art. 5(l)(a)(ii).
35. CATOC, supra note 1, art. 5(1)(a)(ii).
36. Clark, supra note 14, at 172.
37. See Clark, supra note 14, at 172, 173 n.46. See KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note
4, at 176-81, for discussion of other statutes requiring an act.
38. CATOC, supra note 1, art. 5(1) & 34.
39. CATOC, supra note 1, at art. 5(1).
40. CATOC, supra note 1, at art. 34(1).
41. CATOC, supra note 1, at art. 34(2). See also The International Centre for Criminal
Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy and The Centre for International Crime Prevention
(UNODC), Legislative Guide for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime 12 (2003) [hereinafter CATOC Legislative Guide] ("It
is strongly emphasized that while offenses must involve transnationality and organized crime
for the Convention and the international cooperation provisions to apply, neither of these
should be made elements of the domestic offense.").
Summer 2007]
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merely create a narrow transnational offense to comply with the conven-
tion's requirements. 42 Although parties are obligated to supply
information on their implementation and to support various coordination
and improvement efforts, there are no explicit penalties for non-
compliance with CATOC provisions."
III. JAPAN'S CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY BILLS
Without a great deal of debate, Japan's Ministry of Justice, Japan's
Diet, and Japanese media have focused on the common law conspiracy
prong of CATOC's group criminality requirement, leaving the crime of
association with a criminal group aside." All bills introduced in the Diet
have been conspiracy bills . Perhaps politicians' familiarity with the ju-
dicially-developed doctrine of joint principle conspiracy, discussedS 46
below, has led to this focus on conspiracy. Another possible reason is
disappointment with existing law, which attacks criminal organizations
rather than criminal conspiracies. 4 7
42. See Clark, supra note 14, at 168 n.27 (noting that "[t]his is rather a remarkable de-
coupling of the obligations of a Party from the "Transnational" basis of the Convention.").
However, some countries have, despite the requirements of CATOC art. 34(2), included a
transnational element in defining a conspiracy crime Opinion Paper, Japan Fed'n of Bar Ass'n,
JFBA Opposes Criminalization of Conspiracy, (Sept. 14, 2006), available at
http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/activities/statements/060914.html. ("Saint Christopher and
Nevis ratified the Convention without reservations by establishing conspiracy offenses of
which prerequisite the transnational nature.").
43. See Clark, supra note 14, at 183-84.
44. See generally HOMUSHO KEIJI KYOKU [MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL BUREAU],
HANZAI NO KOKUSAIKA OYOB1 NI SOSHIKIKA NARABI NI JYOHO SHORI NO KOUDOKA NI TAI-
SHO SURU TAME NO KEIHO NADO NO ICHIBU wo KAISEI SURU H6RITSUAN NO GAIYO [A
SUMMARY OF CHANGES TO THE CRIMINAL LAW TO DEAL WITH INTERNATIONALIZATION,
INCREASED GROUP ACTIVITY, AND INCREASED USE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY BY CRIMI-
NALS], http://www.moj.go.jp/HOUAN/KYOUBOUZAI/referO5.pdf (Japan) (last visited Mar.
19, 2008) [hereinafter MINISTRY OF JUSTICE SUMMARY] (describing changes required and
CATOC in terms of the conspiracy provision).
45. See Ito, supra note 8, at 76-77.
46. Many bureaucrats and politicians are familiar with the law through undergraduate
legal degrees. See Michael K. Young & Constance Hamilton, The Legal Profession of Japan,
in JAPAN BUSINESS LAW GUIDE sec. 7-010, 7-100 (Mitsuo Matsushita ed., 1988), reprinted in
THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, 46, 50 (Curtis J. Milhaupt, et al. eds., 2006).
47. Boryokudanin ni yoru futona koi no boshi nado ni kan suru horitsu [Anti-Organized
Crime Act], Law No. 77 of 1991 (Japan) (allowing for injunctions against groups identified as
criminal groups). See Mulhaupt & West, supra note 7, at 72-73; NIHON BENGOSHI RENGOKAI
[JAPAN FED'N OF BAR Ass'NS], DAI 9 KAI HANZAI BOSHI OYOBI HANZAISHA NO SHOGUN NI
KAN SURU KOKURENKAIGI HE NO NIHONBENGOSHIRENG6KAI NO HOKOKU [A REPORT FROM
THE JAPAN FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS TO THE NINTH UNITED NATIONS CONGRESS
ON THE PREVENTION OF CRIME AND THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS] para. 177-78 (1995),
http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/ja/humanrights-library/un/crime-report-9th.html (last visited on
Mar. 19, 2008) (noting that criminal groups in Japan have "diversified, expanded and found
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Japan's first bill to criminalize conspiracy 48 was introduced in 2003
in Japan's 156th diet session.4 9 The bill also contained money laundering,
witness tampering, and asset forfeiture provisions, none of which drew
nearly the same level of attention.50 The criminal conspiracy provision is
below:
Article 6-2: The Group Crime of Conspiracy:
Whomever conspires to accomplish an act which is a crime un-
der the following section, as part of a group, be punished as
indicated.
However, if the party surrenders themselves prior to the com-
mencement of the crime, the punishment shall be reduced or the
offender exculpated.
(1) For crimes carrying a penalty of death, life imprison-
ment, or over ten years imprisonment, the penalty shall be up to
five years imprisonment, with or without hard labor.
(2) For crimes carrying a penalty of between four and ten
years, the penalty shall be up to two years imprisonment, with or
without hard labor.5
The group crime of conspiracy contains three basic elements, as well
as a possible fourth implied element. First, the party must conspire with
others. 2 The Ministry of Justice ("MOJ") interprets "conspire" to require
"concrete and actual agreement to commit a certain crime." 3 A mere
more sophisticated ways of profiting illegally"). But see Mulhaupt & West, supra note 7, at 91
("We guardedly conclude from these limited data that enforcement of the Act has negatively
affected the success of organized criminal firms.").
48. Matsumiya Takaaki, Kyrb3zai no shinsetsu to keiho no kino [Functions of the
Criminal law and the Introduction of Conspiracy], HORITSU JIHO, Sept. 2006, 44, at 44 n.l
(Japan).
49. Hanzai no kokusaika oyobi soshikika ni taisho suru tame no keihou nado no ichibu
wo kaisei suru horitsuan [Bill to Revise Part of the Criminal Law to Deal with Intemationali-
zation and Increased Group Criminal Activity], Diet Sess. 156, B. No. 85 of 2003 (Japan) (not
adopted); Ito, supra note 8, at 78 n.21 (including the text of the conspiracy provision from the
163rd and 164th diet session bills).
50. See Matsumiya, supra note 48, at 44, 49 n. I (suggesting other amendments be scru-
tinized in addition to the conspiracy part of the bill).
51. Hanzai no kokusaika oyobi soshikika ni taisho suru tame no keihou nado no ichibu
wo kaisei suru horitsuan [Bill to Revise Part of the Criminal Law to Deal with Internationali-
zation and Increased Group Criminal Activity], Diet Sess. 156, B. No. 85 of 2003 (Japan)
(author's translation).
52. H6MUSHO [MINISTRY OF JUSTICE], SOSHIKITEKINA HANZAI NO KYOBOZAI NI KAN
SURU Q&A [Q&A RELATED TO THE GROUP CRIME OF CONSPIRACY] Question 3, http://
www.moj.go.jp/HOUAN/KYOUBOUZAI/referO6.html (Japan) (last visited Mar. 19, 2008).
53. Id.
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vague discussion at a bar among friends would not satisfy this element,
at least according to the MOJ's interpretation.54
The second element requires that the conspiracy be related to a
group.55 A fleeting association of persons related only by their agreement
to commit a criminal act is not punishable. 6 The MOJ has interpreted
this provision to mean that an informal agreement between friends to
commit a crime is not a punishable conspiracy.
7
Third, only conspiracies to commit a serious crime, defined as a
crime punishable by more than four years imprisonment, are criminal-
ized.58 The definition of a serous crime is based on the maximum
possible sentence for the crime that is the objective of the conspiracy."
This is the narrowest CATOC-permitted definition of criminal objectives
that are punishable. 6° There are over 600 crimes that meet this definition
of serious crime.6'
Finally, there may be an implied fourth element. The bill requires
that a party "conspire." Proponents of the original bill argue that this
language implies that an act must be done indicating an agreement to
62conspire. From the terse language of the bill, it is not clear whether this
is the case or, if so, what kind of act qualifies as an act.63
Since the elements of the bill are defined generally and briefly, and
have not yet been applied, the exact scope of the crime of conspiracy as
defined by the bill is not yet clear.64 Statues in Japan are often stated
54. Id.
55. Ito, supra note 8, at 77. But See KAIDo YiiICHI & HOSAKA NOBUTO, KY6B6ZAI TO
WA NANI KA 25-30 (Iwanami, 2006).
56. H6MUSHO [MINISTRY OF JUSTICE], supra note 52. See Ito, supra note 8, at 77 (dis-
cussing inclusion of the terms "dantai [organization]" and "soshiki [organization]" in the text
of the conspiracy provision); But see KAIDO YcICHI & HOSAKA NOBUTO, KY6B6ZAI TO WA
NANI KA 25-30 (Iwanami, 2006).
57. See H6MUSHO [MINISTRY OF JUSTICE], supra note 52, at 7.
58. See H6MUSHO [MINISTRY OF JUSTICE], supra note 52, at 7.
59. NIHON BENGOSHI RENG6KAI [JAPAN FED'N OF BAR ASs'NS], DAI 163 KAI KOKUKAI
SHINGI NO SHOTEN TO NICHIBENNREN NO SHUCHO: KYOBOZAI, KOKO GA MONDAI DA! at 3
(1996), http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/ja/committee/list/data/kyoubouzai.pdf.
60. See CATOC, supra note 1, art. 2(b); see also CATOC, supra note 1, art. 5(1)(a)(1)
(permitting the limitation of conspiracy to criminal groups). Amendments to the conspiracy
provisions requiring the group to have as their objective serious crime(s) comports with the
CATOC definition of a "Organized Criminal Group" per CATOC art. 2(a)
61. See Japan Fed'n of Bar Ass'n, supra note 42 (noting the uncertain scope of liability
which would result from a new conspiracy law.
62. See generally NIHON BENGOSHI RENG6KAI [JAPAN FED'N OF BAR Ass'NS], supra
note 59. See Hanzai no kokusaika oyobi soshikika ni taisho sum tame no keihou nado no
ichibu wo kaisei suru horitsuan [Bill to Revise Part of the Criminal Law to Deal with Interna-
tionalization and Increased Group Criminal Activity], Diet Sess. 156, Bill No. 85, Art. 6 of
2003 (Japan) (not adopted). An overt act requirement is permitted by CATOC, art. 5(l)(a)(i).
63. See Matsumiya, supra note 48, at 45.
64. See Matsumiya, supra note 48, at 45; see also KAIDO & HOSAKA, supra note 55, at
25-35.
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generally, 65 and in any case courts in Japan tend to not strictly adhere to
statutory language in interpreting law.66 Since the conspiracy bill is
based on CATOC, in defining the scope of a conspiracy law, perhaps
Japan's courts will look to the convention in interpreting the elements
of the crime.6
The 2003 bill was defeated in the legislature.68 Subsequently, a
similar bill introduced in the 159th diet session in 2004 was with-
drawn.69 Yet another similar bill was introduced in the 163rd diet
session7" in 2005,,, and carried forward to future diet sessions.7' The
bills were introduced by the majority and generally conservative Lib-
eral Democratic Party ("LDP") party, with opposition from the
Democratic Party of Japan ("DPJ") and other opposition parties. The
65. See Carl J. Green, Remarks to the Asia Society on the Subject of Japan: "The Rule
of Law Without Lawyers" Reconsidered (Mar. 14, 2001), in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM,
supra note 46, at 154, 157 ("Like contracts, [Japanese] legislation also tends to be terse and
general."). See Martin Shapiro, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 135-48
(1981), reprinted in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 46, at 44.
66. See Dan Fenno Henderson, NUINOSUKE V. CHOBe: CONCILIATION IN TOKUGAWA
CIVIL TRIALS 127-62 (1965), reprinted in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 46, at I
(analyzing historically a Japanese court's resolution of a case, where the court considers a
variety of non-legal factors and looks to resolve the whole situation).
67. See 13 KEISH5 3225 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 16, 1959) (considering several treaties, even to
the extent of the number of UN member countries which approved and signed the treaty pro-
visions, in interpreting article nine of Japan's Constitution, and discussing the necessary
deference to treaties as a political question), reprinted in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra
note 46, at 213, 214-15; Hoshdkin seikyu jiken [Case to Seek Compensation], 60 MINSHU
2853 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 17, 2006), translation available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/
judgments/text/2006.10.17-2004.-Ju-.No..781 .html (Japan) (referring to Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property in interpreting Article 35, paragraph 1-2 of Japan's Patent
Act); Yokotakichi yakan hik6 Sashitome nado seikyu jiken [Case About Suspension of Night
Flights from Yokota Airport], Case No. 882 of 2006 (Sup. Ct., May 29, 2007) (referring to the
US-Japan Security Treaty, but not basing its decision upon it, in denying claims for noise
damages residents near an airport used for U.S. military flights).
68. See Ito, supra note 8, at 74 n.5.
69. Hanzai no kokusaika oyobi soshikika narabi ni jy6h6 shori no takadoka ni taisho
sum tame no keih6 nado no ichibu wo kaisei suru h6ritsuan [Bill to Revise Part of the Penal
Code to Address the Internationalization, Increased Group Activity, and Increased Technology
Use of Criminals], Diet Sess. 159, Bill No. 46 of 2004 (not adopted).
70. See Takada Akimasa, Soshikitekina hanzai no kyb6zai-hontokushfi no shushi
[The Group Crime of Conspiracy: Purpose of the Special Section], H6RITSU JIH6, Sept. 2006,
4-5 (Japan).
71. See generally Hanzai no kokusaika oyobi soshikika narabi ni jy6ho shori no taka-
doka ni taisho suru tame no keih6 nado no ichibu wo kaisei sum h6ritsuan [Bill to Revise Part
of the Penal Code to Address the Internationalization, Increased Group Activity, and Increased
Technology Use of Criminals], Diet Sess. 163 (Special Session), Bill No. 22 of 2005 (delib-
eration continued).
72. See Takada, supra note 70, 4-5; Kaido Yfiichi, [Kinji] no s[o]shikihanzai [The
Meaning of Recent Trends in Legislation Against Group Crime and the Newly-Established
Conspiracy], H6RITSU JIHO, Sept. 2006, 20, at 20 (Japan). For a list of all the conspiracy bills,
showing the LDP cabinet as their source, go to http://hourei.ndl.go.jp, click on the link for
"Horitsuan," and enter the term "kokusaika [internationalization]" into the search box. Results
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bills faced opposition, sometimes even from LDP members,73 and lan-
guished in the Diet.74
Three proposed modifications to the 163rd session bill's conspiracy
provision were made in short succession in 2006."5 Each revision nar-
76rowed the proposed definition of conspiracy. In general, the political
alignment behind the modifications was unsurprising, with LDP party
sponsors introducing minor modifications to increase support within the
diet for passage of the bill, while the opposition DPJ fought unsuccess-
fully for more aggressive limitation of the bill.77 The LDP introduced the
first proposed amendment to the bill in part to address concern about the
initial bill's vagueness. 78 The modified conspiracy section reads:
Whomever conspires to accomplish an act which is a crime un-
der the following section, as part of a group, (where the
objective of the group is to commit a crime listed in this sec-
tion, or in section one [which enumerates certain other crimes])
and where an act that contributes to the success of the con-
spiracy has been committed by a member of the group towards
the accomplishment of the conspiracy, will be punished as indi-
cated.
However, if the party surrenders themselves prior to the com-
mencement of the crime, the punishment shall be reduced or the
offender exculpated.
are Diet Session 156, Bill No. 85, Diet Session 159, Bill No. 46, and Diet Session 163, Bill
No. 22, all listed as being introduced by the cabinet. For a detailed history of the three bills,
select a bill and press the "sentaku hy6ji" button.
73. See Japan Fed'n of Bar Ass'ns, supra note 59, at 15-16.
74. See Ito, supra note 8, at 74 n.5; Kaido, supra note 72, at 24 (2006).
75. Revision No.1 introduced April 21, 2006 by the LDP, revision No.2 introduced
April 28, 2006 by the DPJ, and revision No.3 introduced May 19, 2006 by the LDP. To find
further information, go to http://hourei.ndl.go.jp (click on the link for "Horitsuan," and enter
the term "kokusaika [internationalization]" into the search box; select the third item, Diet
Session 163, Bill No. 22, and press the "sentaku hy6ji" button to see a history of the bill, in-
cluding the three proposed revisions, "shiiseian").
76. See Matsumiya, supra note 48, at 47 (detailing one such amendment and noting the
multiple amendments to the bill).
77. See DPJ Refuses to Vote on Conspiracy Bill, Postpones Tabling Revisions, Kyodo
News Service (Japan) (June 2, 2006).
78. Editorial, Conspiring on a Weak Bill, Japan Times, Mar. 11, 2006 (concern over the
"loose" definition of conspiracy crime resulted in scrapping of bills). See, e.g., Dai 162 kai
kokkai 7 gatsu 12 nichi h6muiinkai no ugoki, 7 gatsu 12 nichi, ka, dai 26 kai [162nd Legisla-
tive Session, Activities of the July 12 Committee on Judicial Affairs, Tuesday the Twelfth,
Meeting Number 26] Diet Sess. 162 (2005), available at http://www.shugiin.go.jp/itdb-
rchome.nsf/html/rchome/Ugoki/honbun/houmu 16220050712026.htm?OpenDocument (ex-
plaining that four LDP members joined with five opposition party members to question
various aspects of the 159th Diet Session conspiracy bill, bill number 46).
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(1) For crimes carrying a penalty of death, life imprisonment, or
over ten years imprisonment, the penalty shall be up to five
years imprisonment, with or without hard labor.
(2) For crimes carrying a penalty of between four and ten years,
the penalty shall be up to two years imprisonment, with or with-
out hard labor.7 9
The first proposed amendment contains several modifications, two
of which were modifications to the text of the conspiracy provision it-
self.80 First, only groups with an objective to commit a serious crime
qualify as conspirator groups.8' This limitation is permitted by the terms
of CATOC.12 Second, an act must be committed which contributes to the
success of the conspiracy.83 This act limitation seems ineffective, as es-
sentially all acts can be said to contribute to the success of the
conspiracy.84
The first proposed amendment to the 163rd session bill also added
several general limitations on the application of a conspiracy offense.85
First, the conspiracy provision "shall not intrude freedom of thought and
conscience, and thus the law may not be applied to limit legitimate group
activities. 86 This provision is similar to article 19 of Japan's constitu-
tion.17 Also, in a modification unrelated to conspiracy, the witness
79. Hanzai no kokusaika oyobi soshikika narabi ni jy6h6 shori no kodoka ni taisho sum
tame no keih6 nado no ichibu wo kaisei sum h6ritsuan ni tai sum shOseian [Proposed Amend-
ment to Bill to Revise Part of the Penal Code to Address the Internationalization, Increased
Group Activity, and Increased Technology Use of Criminals], Diet Sess. 164, Revision No. 1 to
Bill No. 22 of Diet Sess. 163 of 2006 (translation is the Author's, with additions to the Bill in
bold), available at http://www.shugiin.go.jp/index.nsf/htmllindex-gian.htm (scroll down to
select Bill No. 22 of Sess. 163 for a list of revisions).
80. See MATSUMIYA, supra note 48, at 47.
81. See MATSUMIYA, supra note 48, at 47.
82. See CATOC, supra note 1, art. 2(a) & 5(l)(a)(i).
83. See Matsumiya, supra note 48, at 47.
84. See Matsumiya, supra note 48, at 47.
85. Hanzai no kokusaika oyobi soshikika narabi ni jy6h6 shori no kodoka ni taisho sum
tame no keih6 nado no ichibu wo kaisei suru h6ritsuan ni tai suru shaiseian [Proposed Amend-
ment to Bill to Revise Part of the Penal Code to Address the Internationalization, Increased
Group Activity, and Increased Technology Use of Criminals], supra note 79. (For a useful but
non-authoritative source listing the changes incorporated in this revision to the bill, see
http://kyobo.syuriken.jp/syuseian.htm) (last visited Mar. 19, 2008).
86. Hanzai no kokusaika oyobi soshikika narabi ni jy6h6 shori no kodoka ni taisho
suru tame no keih6 nado no ichibu wo kaisei sur h6ritsuan ni tai suru shiseian [Proposed
Amendment to Bill to Revise Part of the Penal Code to Address the Internationalization, In-
creased Group Activity, and Increased Technology Use of Criminals], supra note 79 at sec. 6-3.
87. See KENP6, art. 19 ("Freedom of thought and conscience shall not be violated"),
translated in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 46, at 739.
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bribery provision of the bill is amended with a prohibition that it "shall
not be applied to limit the legitimate activities of an attorney.
' 88
The opposition DPJ proposed a second revision to the 163rd session
bill that was introduced shortly after the first LDP proposal, on April
28th, 2006.89 The proposal limits the conspiracy provision explicitly to
"criminal groups." 90 This modification was intended to limit the applica-
tion of the proposed law to international criminal organizations, 9' which
is prohibited by the terms of CATOC.92 Also, the objective of the con-
spiracy must be to commit crimes punishable by imprisonment for a
minimum of five years (instead of four).93 The change from four to five
years would also violate the terms of CATOC, which requires that crimes
punishable by four or more years imprisonment be included in the defi-
nition of criminal objectives of a conspiracy.94 Thus, both modifications
to the text of the conspiracy provision that were introduced by the DPJ in
the second proposed amendment explicitly violate the requirements of
CATOC.95
88. Hanzai no kokusaika oyobi soshikika narabi ni jy6h6 shori no kodoka ni taisho sum
tame no keih6 nado no ichibu wo kaisei sum h6ritsuan ni tai sum shfiseian 7-3 [Proposed
Amendment to Bill to Revise Part of the Penal Code to Address the Internationalization, In-
creased Group Activity, and Increased Technology Use of Criminals, sec. 7-2(3)], Diet Sess.
164, Revision No. I to Bill No. 22 of Diet Sess. 163 of 2006.
89.See id.; Hanzai no kokusaika oyobi soshikika narabi ni jy6ho shori no takadoka ni taisho
suru tame no keih6 nado no ichibu wo kaisei suru h6ritsuan ni tai sum shfseian 7-2-(3) [Pro-
posed Amendment to Bill to Revise Part of the Penal Code to Address the Internationalization,
Increased Group Activity, and Increased Technology Use of Criminals sec. 7-2-(3)], Diet Sess.
164, Minutes of Judicial Affairs Committee Session No. 21 of 2006.
90. Hanzai no kokusaika oyobi soshikika narabi ni jy6h6 shori no takadoka ni taisho
suru tame no keih6 nado no ichibu wo kaisei sum horitsuan ni tai sum shaseian [Proposed
Amendment to Bill to Revise Part of the Penal Code to Address the Internationalization, In-
creased Group Activity, and Increased Technology Use of Criminals], Diet Sess. 164, Revision
No. 2 to Bill No. 22 of Diet Sess. 163 of 2006.
91. Hanzai no kokusaika oyobi soshikika narabi ni jy6ho shori no takadoka ni taisho
suru tame no keih6 nado no ichibu wo kaisei suru h6ritsuan ni tai sum shiiseian [Proposed
Amendment to Bill to Revise Part of the Penal Code to Address the Internationalization, In-
creased Group Activity, and Increased Technology Use of Criminals], Diet Sess. 164, Minutes
of Judicial Affairs Committee Session No. 22 of 2006 (statement of committee member Taka-
yama Satoshi, that since convention is a convention against transnational crime, the law should
be limited in application to international criminal groups).
92. See Clark, supra note 13, at 168 n.27.
93. Hanzai no kokusaika oyobi soshikika narabi ni jy6h6 shori no takadoka ni taisho
sum tame no keih6 nado no ichibu wo kaisei suru h6ritsuan ni tai sum shfiseian [Proposed
Amendment to Bill to Revise Part of the Penal Code to Address the Internationalization, In-
creased Group Activity, and Increased Technology Use of Criminals], supra note 90.
94. See CATOC, supra note 1, art. 2(b).
95. See Editorial, Conspiracy of Dunces Thwarts Conspiracy Bill, DAILY YOMIURI,
June 4, 2006 ("The DPJ-sponsored bill would limit conspiracy charge to crimes that carry a
sentence of more that five years of imprisonment and to international crime. However, the
U.N. convention requires member countries to make conspiracy charges applicable to crimes
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The second proposed amendment also contains a general limitation
on the application of conspiracy law that is more expansive than that
contained in the first revision:
Whereas the people of Japan have certain freedoms and rights
guaranteed by the constitution, namely the freedom of thought,
religion, assembly, association, expression, and scholarship, as
well as the freedom to form labor unions and operate as mem-
bers thereof, unreasonable application of section 6-2 [the
conspiracy provision] is not permitted.96
This general provision contains language similar to several constitutional
provisions."
A third proposed revision to the 163rd session bill was introduced by
the LDP on May 19th, 2006."8 This third proposed revision essentially
returned to the language of the LDP's first proposed revision.99 Applica-
tion of the conspiracy law is limited to groups that have as their objective
the commission of serious crimes.'O°Also, conspiracy law may not be
used to limit legitimate activities, for the purpose of maintaining free-
dom of thought and conscience. '0' Debate has continued on the
that are punishable by four or more years of imprisonment. The convention also calls on
member countries not to limit the types of offenses to international crime.").
96. Hanzai no kokusaika oyobi soshikika narabi ni jy~h6 shori no takadoka ni taisho
sum tame no keih6 nado no ichibu wo kaisei suru h6ritsuan ni tai sum shaseian [Proposed
Amendment to Bill to Revise Part of the Penal Code to Address the Internationalization, In-
creased Group Activity, and Increased Technology Use of Criminals], supra note 90.
97. See KEMP6 [CONSTITUTION], Arts. 19 ("Thought and conscience"), 21 ("Freedom
of assembly and association as well as speech"), 23 ("Academic freedom"), 28 ("The right of
workers to organize and to bargain and act collectively is guaranteed") translated in THE
JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 46, at 738-39.
98. Hanzai no kokusaika oyobi soshikika narabi ni jy6h6 shoi no takadoka ni taisho
sum tame no keih6 nado no ichibu wo kaisei sum h6ritsuan ni tai suru shfiseian [Proposed
Amendment to Bill to Revise Part of the Penal Code to Address the Internationalization, In-
creased Group Activity, and Increased Technology Use of Criminals], Diet Sess. 164, Revision
No. 3 to Bill No. 22 of Diet Session 163 of 2006. For a description of the timing and sponsorship
of each bill and revision, see Ito, supra note 8, at 74 n.5; see also Kaido, supra note 72, 24.
99. Hanzai no kokusaika oyobi soshikika narabi ni jy6h6 shori no takadoka ni taisho
sum tame no keih6 nado no ichibu wo kaisei suru h6ritsuan ni tai suru shiiseian [Proposed
Amendment to Bill to Revise Part of the Penal Code to Address the Internationalization, In-
creased Group Activity, and Increased Technology Use of Criminals], Diet Sess. 164, Revision
No. 3 to Bill No. 22 of Diet Session 163 of 2006.
100. Hanzai no kokusaika oyobi soshikika narabi ni jy6h6 shori no takadoka ni taisho
sum tame no keih6 nado no ichibu wo kaisei suru h6itsuan ni tai suru shiiseian [Proposed
Amendment to Bill to Revise Part of the Penal Code to Address the Internationalization, In-
creased Group Activity, and Increased Technology Use of Criminals], Diet Sess. 164, Revision
No. 3 to Bill No. 22 of Diet Session 163 of 2006.
101. Hanzai no kokusaika oyobi soshikika narabi ni jy6h6 shori no takadoka ni taisho
sum tame no keih6 nado no ichibu wo kaisei suru h6itsuan ni tai suru shflseian [Proposed
Amendment to Bill to Revise Part of the Penal Code to Address the Internationalization,
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conspiracy bill through 2006,'02 with no version of the bill adopted by the
year's end.'0 3
A. Comparison to American Criminal Conspiracy
With the caveat that cultural differences make it difficult to compare
laws across legal systems, °' the conspiracy bill appears to fall comforta-
bly within the scope of two common definitions of conspiracy: those
found in American common-law conspiracy and in the Model Penal
Code ("MPC"). °5 The conspiracy bill in some ways is more narrowly
defined than these common definitions of conspiracy, and indeed is more
narrowly defined than enterprise liability as defined by the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO").' °6
The conspiracy bill is quite similar to common-law conspiracy. 1
7
Both punish agreement to commit a crime as an independent offense.' 8
The conspiracy bill contains narrowing provisions similar to those found
in the progressive MPC'09 and more recent statutes in the United States;"
a conspirator must commit an act in furtherance of the conspiracy.'
Common law conspiracy, in contrast, requires no such act, and the mere
agreement to commit a crime, without more, is punishable." 2 As no con-
Increased Group Activity, and Increased Technology Use of Criminals], Diet Sess. 164, Revi-
sion No. 3 to Bill No. 22 of Diet Session 163 of 2006.
102. See Takada, supra note 70, at 5.
103. See Masami Ito, Abe's Honeymoon Diet Session Ends with a Whimper, JAPAN
TIMEs, Dec. 20, 2006. See generally "Zangy6dai zero" nado yot6 mo igi ... naikakushijiritu,
honsha seronchdsa [Even the Government Party Objects to the White Collar Exemption Bill-
Cabinet's Approval Rating Keeps on Decreasing According to our Opinion Poll], YOMIURI
SHINBUm, (Japan), Jan. 23, 2007 (discussing discord within the prime minister's party over
the conspiracy bill as source of delayed adoption)"; Japan Federation of Bar Associations,
http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/ja/event/070928.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2008) (advertising
meeting of Diet members opposed to a conspiracy law to be held on Sept. 28, 2007).
104. See Edward M. Wise, RICO and Its Analogues: Some Comparative Considerations,
27 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 303, 305, 313 (2000); Elmer H. Johnson, Ichihara Prison
for Traffic Offenders: An Innovative Model in Japan, 1 INT'L CRIM. JUST. REV. 53, 54 (1991).
105. See Nara Toshio, Eibeihou no konsupirashii to "soshikiteki hanzai no ky6b~zai":
Kydbd no shobatu [Anglo-American Conspiracy and "The Group Offense of Conspiracy":
Punishment for Conspiracy], HORITSU JIH6, Sept. 2006, 28.
106. See 18 U.S.C. sec. 1962; KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 4, at 730sec.
107. Nara, supra note 105, at 33 (calling the conspiracy bill's provisions "kiwamete kinji
shite iru [extremely similar]" to common-law conspiracy).
108. See Nara, supra note 105, at 33.
109. MODEL PENAL CODE sec. 5.03 (1981).
110. See Peter Buscemi, Note, Conspiracy Statutory Reform Since the Model Penal
Code, 6 COL. L. REV. 1122,1125 (1975).
Ill. See MODEL PENAL CODE sec. 5.03 (1981); 18 U.S.C. sec. 371 (1994). See also
Nara, supra note 105, at 34; KAiDO Y6i1CHI & HOSAKA NOBUTO, KY6B6ZAI TO WA NANI KA
36-43 (Iwanami, 2006).
112. See KADISH & SHULHOFER, supra note 4, at 701-03.
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spiracy law has been adopted in Japan, a further detailed comparison is
not yet possible." 3
Another similarity between the conspiracy bill and the MPC is that
punishment is lessened if a party renounces the conspiracy. ' 4 Renuncia-
tion provisions are more detailed in the MPC."'5 The MPC offers a
complete defense for conspirators who renounce and thwart the conspir-
acy of which they were a member."6 Continuing liability for acts of the
conspiracy stops under the MPC for a party who either informs the other
conspirators of his renunciation, or informs the authorities about the
conspiracy."' The conspiracy bill is much less detailed, as the bill simply
allows for either reduction in punishment or non-punishment for a party
who surrenders.'1
8
In two ways, the conspiracy bill is more narrowly drafted than MPC
or common-law conspiracy. As required by CATOC,"9 the conspiracy
must be related to an organization."0 By contrast, it is possible under
both common-law conspiracy and the MPC to punish a fleeting agree-
ment between otherwise unrelated parties. 2' Secondly, the bill's serious-
crime requirement narrows its application to only those crimes which are
punishable by four or more years of imprisonment. 
2
113. See Japan Fed'n of Bar Ass'ns, supra note 42 (noting uncertainty of the proposal's
scope).
114. See MODEL PENAL CODE sec. 5.03(6) (2006) ("It is an affirmative defense that the
actor, after conspiring to commit a crime, thwarted the success of the conspiracy, under cir-
cumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose.").
115. This is typical in Japanese legislation. Shapiro, supra note 65, at 44 (noting gener-
ally short legislative provisions in Japan).
116. See MODEL PENAL CODE sec. 5.03(6).
117. See MODEL PENAL CODE sec. 5.03 (7)(a), (c) (1981).
118. Hanzai no kokusaika oyobi soshikika narabi ni jyfh shon no takadoka ni taisho
suru tame no keih6 nado no ichibu wo kaisei sum hfritsuan [Bill to Revise Part of the Penal
Code to Address the Internationalization, Increased Group Activity, and Increased Technology
Use of Criminals], Diet Sess. 159, Bill No. 46 of 2004 (not adopted). Note that it is typical
that Japanese law to be generally stated.
119. See Clark, supra note 14, at 171 n.42. Although states have the choice to either
criminalize conspiracy or association with a criminal group, in either case the crime must be
related to an organization.
120. See HfMUSHO [MINISTRY OF JUSTICE], SOSHIKITEKINA HANZAI NO KY61BOZAI NI
KAN SURU Q&A [Q&A RELATED TO THE GROUP CRIME OF CONSPIRACY. See Ito, supra note
8, at 77-78 (stating that the bill defines offense using "dantai [organization] and "soshiki [or-
ganization]"). But see KAiDo, YaICHI & HOSAKA NOBUTO, KYf6BZAI TO WA NANI KA 25-30
(Iwanami, 2006).
121. See KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 4, at 697-98; Wise, supra note 104, at 316
(comparing conspiracy, which does not require a durable group, and the crime of group crimi-
nalization, which does).
122. See CATOC, supra note 1, art. 2(b).
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B. Comparison to RICO
The onsirac bil's rou " 123
The conspiracy bill's group requirement invites comparison with
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"),
1 24
which punishes criminality associated with an "enterprise."'25 The RICO
"enterprise" began as a broadly defined term, 26 and the conspiracy bill
definition of group is similarly broad. 27 Legislative debate concerning
the scope of enterprise liability for RICO appears similar to that taking
place now surrounding Japan's conspiracy bill.
28
While RICO is a complex and controversial statute, it does appear
that RICO liability extends farther than liability under Japan's conspir-
acy bill. 29 The conspiracy bill most likely requires that each member
agree to join the same conspiracy, and that an overt act be committed. 30
Some proposed revisions to the conspiracy bill go farther in requiring
that the accused commit an act in furtherance of the conspiracy with
which they are charged. 3' By contrast, RICO conspiracy liability'3 2 ex-
tends to "even remote associates of an enterprise."' 3 A defendant need
only have committed two crimes 34 related to the enterprise.3 The defen-
dant does not need to know the purpose, activities, or scope of the
conspiracy. 1
36
123. See Ito, supra note 8, 77-78.
124. See KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 4, at 730; 18 U.S.C. sec. 1962 (2006).
125. Michael Goldsmith, RICO and Enterprise Criminality: A Response to Gerard E.
Lynch, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 774, 791 n.1 19 (1988) (claiming that the essence of the violation is
racketeering in connection with the conduct of an enterprise); see also Wise, supra note 104,
at 307.
126. KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 4, at 372. E.g., United States v. Marubeni Am.
Corp., 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980) (members of large Japanese company charged with RICO
violations).
127. Ito, supra note 8, 77-78 (discussing inclusion of the terms "dantai" [organization]
and "soshiki" [organization] in the text of the conspiracy provision). See also KlDo YiiIcH1 &
HOSAKA NOBUTO, KY6B6ZAI TO WA NANI KA 25-30 (Iwanami, 2006).
128. For example, compare the following discussions of RICO liability and liability
under the conspiracy bill. Goldsmith, supra note 125, 786-88 (1988); Ito, supra note 8, at 77.
129. See Nara, supra note 105, at 34.
130. See Nara, supra note 105, at 34.
131. Matsumiya, supra note 48, at 47.
132. See 18 U.S.C. sec. 1962 (d) (2006).sec.
133. Barry Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM
L. REV. 165,247 (1980).
134. Morgan Cloud, Organized Crime, RICO, and the European Union, 27 SYRACUSE J.
INT'L L. & COM. 243, 255 (2000) (any violation of state or federal law included in the defini-
tion of "predicate" acts).
135. Tarlow, supra note 132, at 250; Cloud, supra note 133, at 255.
136. Tarlow, supra note 132, at 250.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF JAPAN'S PROPOSED CONSPIRACY LAW
As discussed in section III, the provisions of Japan's conspiracy bill
are similar to the well-established Model Penal Code, and in some way
the bill is more limited than common-law conspiracy. 1et the bill has
faced strong resistance, going beyond the typical academic debate con-
cerning conspiracy law.'38 Part of the debate is based on Japan's existing
law related to group criminal liability. 9 In particular, the judicially-
created doctrine of joint principal conspiracy may overlap with some
aspects of a conspiracy law.4"Another reason for the debate is that
criminal procedure and police practices in Japan may create opportuni-
ties for abuse of a conspiracy law.'
4'
Section A describes existing Japanese law related to group criminal-
ity. Section B describes Japan's criminal procedure and police practice.
Section C discusses criticisms of a criminal conspiracy law, including
concerns arising from overlap with existing criminal group liability.
A. Japan's Group Criminality Law
There are several areas of criminal law in Japan related to group
crime.' 42 Japan's penal code contains group criminality provisions.43 In
addition to this statutory group criminal liability, judicial decisions have
created a controversial doctrine of joint principal conspiracy.'"
1. Penal Code Group Criminality Provisions
Japan does have existing criminal laws that hold parties accountable
for the acts of others. 4 1 Persons who act jointly in the perpetration of a
crime are all principals. 46 Courts sometimes characterize joint actors as
137. See Toshio, supra note 104.
138. Opposition and criticism of the conspiracy bills is discussed in Section IV.C. An
example of such opposition is NICHIBENREN HA KY6B6ZAI NI HANTAI SHIMASU [JAPAN FED-
ERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS OPPOSES CONSPIRACY LAW], (Sept. 14, 2006), available at
http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/ja/special-theme/complicity.html.
139. For an example of criticism applying Japan's current criminal laws to criticize the
conspiracy bills, see KAIDO & HOSAKA, supra note 56, 7-13.
140. Japan Fed'n of Bar Ass'ns, supra note 42.
141. Shinya Tatsuyuki, Kyrb~zai no seitei to sousa, keisatsu katsudo [Police Investiga-
tion and the Enactment of a Criminal Conspiracy Law], HORITSU JIH, Sept. 2006, at 56.
142. See generally, SHIGEMITSU DANDO, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF JAPAN: THE GENERAL
PART 215-67 (B.J. George trans., 1997).
143. Id.
144. An early statement of the doctrine appears in 12 KEISHU 1718 (Sup. Ct., May 28,
1958).
145. DANDO, supra note 142 at 70-76, 215-219, 248-52, 414-15.
146. KEIHO [PENAL CODE] art. 60; DANDO, supra note 142, at 414. 59 KEISH1 1108,
(Osaka High Ct., Oct. 31, 2002) (translation of KEIH6 [PENAL CODE], Act No. 45 of 1907, art.
60).
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collaborators.17 Having a deep relationship with a party who commits a
criminal act and completing at least one related bad act is enough to be
considered a collaborator and thus a principal.'48 A person who collabo-
rates in the perpetration of a crime can be a principal even if the person
lacks the personal status required by the crime. 49 For example, where a
public official and a political supporter jointly act to accept a bribe, the
supporter is a collaborator and thus a principal in the crime of accepting
a bribe, even through the supporter is not a public official.'50
Criminal liability also exists beyond those directly involved in the
crime.'' Aiding and instigating a crime are punishable,'52 but at a lesser
rate than actual committing the underlying offense."' However, if an
aider or instigator is deeply involved in the offense, he or she may be
found liable as a principal with no reduction in punishment. 4 The Penal
Code allows for a limited expansion of the concept of instigation. One
who "instigates an instigator" is also an instigator, and thus a principal.'55
At least one case has endorsed "serial instigation," which expands this
concept indefinitely, but this unlimited expansion of liability is not fa-
vored by scholars.'56
Criminal liability also exists for crimes that are not completed, as in-
choate crimes are also a well-established part of Japan's penal code.'57
For example, attempts are punishable, but only when specifically so
stated in the relevant penal code section.'58 Defenses to an inchoate
criminal charge are similar to those in the MPC; for example, impossi-
bility is a complete defense to an attempt charge. "9
147. 59 KEISHfi 1108 (Osaka High Ct., Oct. 31, 2002).
148. See id. (defendant liable as collaborator in the crime of special misappropriation
where defendant and criminal actor had billions of yen in unsecured loans between each other,
and defendant committed the unfair act of submitted a forged appraisal report).
149. KEIH6, art. 65; DANDO, supra note 142, at 415 (appendix translation of the criminal
code).
150. 58 KEISHi 905 (Tokyo High Ct., Nov. 8, 2004).
151. See DANDO, supra note 142.
152. KEIH6 art. 61; DANDO, supra note 142, at 414
153. KEIH6, art. 62-63; DANDO, supra note 142, at 414.
154. 55 KEISHOi 519 (Tokyo High Ct., Sept 25, 2001) (Mother who requested eldest son
to commit robbery, prepared the air gun, mask, and tools, and received and used the proceeds
was a joint principal).
155. DANDO, supra note 142, at 247; HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 419-20 (2d ed.
1999); KEIH6, art. 61, para. 2.
156. DANDO, supra note 142, at 247 n.98.
157. KEIH6, art. 43-44.
158. KEIH6, art. 44; DANDO, supra note 142, at 411.
159. See J. MARK RAMSEYER & MINORu NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC
APPROACH 168 (1999).
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2. The Judicial Doctrine of Joint Principal Conspiracy
Courts have developed a controversial'" doctrine of joint principal
conspiracy, '6 which is broader than the statutory joint principal liability
discussed above. 62 The doctrine of joint principal conspiracy has two
elements: First, two or more persons must agree to commit a specific
crime and to rely on each other's actions to commit the crime.' 63 Second,
at least one of these persons must take some action based on the conspir-
acy." Persons who join the conspiracy through agreement are all guilty
as principals, even if they did not take part in the actual execution of the
crime. Where person A conspired with B, and then B conspired with C,
all such persons may be deemed to have made a single conspiracy to
commit the offense.'66 For example, where a defendant (A) made an
agreement with one party (B) to attack a victim, and then (B) on a sepa-
rate occasion made an agreement with another party (C) to attack the
same victim, all three could be liable for the actual attack as joint princi-
pals.
67
160. ODA, supra note 155, at 420 (citing 12 KEISH5 1718 and noting that "[wihether it is
possible to punish a person who did not actually take part in committing a crime, but master-
minded it and conspired with the others as a principal is a matter of dispute.").
161. The judicial doctrine of joint principle conspiracy is referred to as "ky6b6 kyod6
seihan" Uoint principal conspiracy], as opposed to the proposed statutory 'kyb" [conspir-
acy]. Examples of cases applying the doctrine include 59 KEISHOi 1847 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 29,
2005) available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.11.29-2004.-A-
.No..2172.html (noting defendant's guilt in conspiracy to kidnap, but that the defendant was
not a member of the conspiracy to kill); 58 KEISHui 524 (Sup. Ct., Sept. 10, 2004) available at
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.11.29-2004.-A-.No..347.html (overturn-
ing bank president and directors conspiracy conviction to breach trust of the corporation on
other grounds); 60 MINsH5 1728 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 25, 2006) available at
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2006.04.25-2004.-Gyo-Hi-.No..86.and.2004.-
Gyo-Hi-.No..87.html (tax fraud conspiracy); 58 MINSHOI 1135 (Sup. Ct., May 25, 2004) avail-
able at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2004.05.25-2003-Kyo-No..40.html
(insurance fraud). See also Miura Faces Return to Prison After Supreme Court Ruling, THE
JAPAN TIMES Sept. 18, 1998 available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/nn 19980918a3.html (conspiracy to commit murder).
162. See 12 KEIsHO 1718 (Sup. Ct., May 28, 1958).
163. See 12 KEISHO 1718 (Sup. Ct., May 28, 1958).
164. See 12 KEISHUi 1718 (Sup. Ct., May 28, 1958).For example, if A and B reach an
agreement, either A or B must take such an action.
165. See 12 KEISHE 1718 (Sup. Ct., May 28, 1958); see also 17 KEISHU 1795 (Sup. Ct.,
Oct. 17, 1963) (referencing 12 KEISHO 1718).
166. 12 KEISH5 1718 (Sup. Ct., May 28, 1958), available at
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1958.05.28-1954.-A-.No.. 1056.html (finding
that when one member of original conspiracy further conspired with others, all were liable as
principals in the subsequent offense).
167. See 12 KEISHG 1718 (Sup. Ct., May 28, 1958). See also 17 KEISHQ 1795 (finding a
conspiracy to kill a government official between those who agreed to investigate the move-
ments of the officials, the party who ordered the shooting, and the shooter).
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The actions of a group of defendants can constitute agreement, sat-
isfying the first element of a joint principal conspiracy.16 In one case, a
group of juvenile defendants acted together to rape and murder a vic-
tim.' 69 The defendants seized the victim and took her to a remote
location in their stolen vehicles.' 70 All of the defendants except one
were found liable for at least attempted rape of victim.'7 ' One defen-
dant, "F", was also clearly at the scene, and had almost certainly
interacted with the victim.' 7 2 All defendants were liable for the subse-
quent murder of the victim.' 73 On these facts, defendant F was a
conspirator in the rape."'
The doctrine is an expansion of joint principal liability under sec-
tion 60'17 of the criminal code. 7 6 One rationale behind joint principal
conspiracy liability is that a person who uses another to accomplish a
criminal act is liable for the underlying offense, much as would be the
case for using a tool such as a weapon to commit a crime."'
Scholars criticize joint principal liability as going beyond the legis-
lative purpose of section 60."' The joint principal conspiracy doctrine
has been characterized as generally "vague and obscure," with each
judge applying the doctrine differently.7 9 Judges also apply conspiracy-
like language to find liability based on sections of the penal code other
than section 60.180 Due to the vagueness of the judicial doctrine, some
168. See 54 MINSH6 255 (Sup. Ct., Feb. 7, 2000).
169. See 54 MINSHfi 255 (Sup. Ct., Feb. 7, 2000).
170. See 54 MINSHti 255 (Sup. Ct., Feb. 7, 2000).
171. See 54 MINSHfI 255 (Sup. Ct., Feb. 7, 2000).
172. See 54 MINSHil 255 (Sup. Ct., Feb. 7, 2000).
173. See 54 MINSHU 255 (Sup. Ct., Feb. 7, 2000).
174. See 54 MINSHfi 255 (Sup. Ct., Feb. 7, 2000).
175. KEIHO [PENAL CODE] art. 60.
176. See 12 KEISH5 1718 (Sup. Ct., May 28, 1958) (describing judicially-developed
doctrine of joint principal conspiracy).
177. See 12 KEISHU 1718 (Sup. Ct., May 28, 1958) ("such a person can be regarded as
also having committed the offense by using another's act as a means") (Adapted from English
translation by the Judicial Research Foundation).
178. See Matsumiya, supra note 48, at 45 n.4.
179. See Sagawa Yukako, Case of a Principal Offender in a Concerted Action Absent
Explicit Conspiracy, 22 RITSUMEIKAN L. REV. 126, 128 (2005), accord. Asada Kazushige,
Kyobdzai ga hanzairon ni oyobosu eikyo [The Effect of Conspiracy on Criminal Law Theory],
HORITSU JIH6, Sept. 2006, 53 (noting authority critical of the judicial doctrine of conspiracy).
See, e.g., 56 KEISHfi 307 (Sup. Ct., Jul. 18, 2002) ("independently or in conspiracy with X and
Y" not a constitutionally vague charge); 55 KEISH6 127 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 11, 2001) (conspiracy
conviction facts were not insufficient where time, place and method of killing were not speci-
fied and finding was that "A or the defendant or both of them killed B by strangling him with
his hands or tools or by other similar methods.").
180. See 60 KEiSHui 9 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 21, 2006) (affirming criminal liability based on
Penal Code art. 61), available at http://www.courts.go.jp/englishljudgments/text/2006.11.21-
2005.-A-.No..302.html; 27 KEISH5i 547 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 25, 1973), available at http://www.
courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1973.04.25-1968-A-No.2780.html (finding that conspir-
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critics fear that courts will combine the existing judicial doctrine of
joint principal conspiracy with a new conspiracy law to greatly expand
liability for the substantive underlying crimes committed by members
of the conspiracy. 8'
The use of confessions of defendants accused of joint principal
conspiracy against each other is a concern of critics of the doctrine. 
82
Normally, a defendant may not be convicted constitutionally solely
based on their own confession.' However, in the case of joint principal
conspiracy, a conviction may be based on confessions of other parties
to the conspiracy because this is not a conviction "solely based on their
own confession."'84 Other constitutional protections continue to oper-
ate, however.' For example, a co-conspirator's confessions that were
obtained where investigators falsely told each party that the other had
confessed were disallowed as unconstitutionally coerced. 
86
Liability under the joint principal conspiracy doctrine may be
expanding.8 7 The judicial doctrine of joint principal conspiracy had
been understood as requiring intentional agreement to commit the
criminal objective of the conspiracy. 88 However, Japan's Supreme
Court applied the joint principal conspiracy doctrine in 1993 where
only an implicit understanding existed.' The defendant, the head of a
acy, instigation, or incitement of illegal worker action violates National Public Service Law);
20 KEISH5 901 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 26, 1966), available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/
judgments/text/1966.10.26-1964-A-No..296.html (finding that National Public Service Law,
No. 120 of 1947, criminalizes conspiracy to commit its provisions).
181. See Japan Fed'n of Bar Ass'ns, supra note 42 ("Currently, co-principals are punish-
able for implied conspiracy. If the conspiracy itself is criminalized, the implied conspiracy
forms conspiracy offenses and the scope of punishment might be extremely broaden [sic].");
NIHON BENGOSHI RENGOKAI [JAPAN FEDERATION OF BAR AssocIATIONS], supra note 59, at
24-26; cf Matsumiya, supra note 48, at 45-46. Such expanded liability would be similar to
Pinkerton liability under some U.S. conspiracy laws. See generally KADISH & SCHULHOFER,
supra note 4, at 684-91.
182. See Tatsuyuki, supra note 140 (discussing the problem of using co-conspirators
confessions against other co-conspirators in the context of the proposed conspiracy law).
183. KENP6, art. 38, para. 2.
184. 12 KEISH5 1718, para. 8 (constitutional provision should be "strictly construed" as
an exception to the principle of free evaluation of evidence). But see 54 MinshO 255 (Sup. Ct.,
Feb. 7, 2000) (conspiracy liability of several juveniles was improper where it was based al-
most solely on their confessions).
185. See 24 KEISHU 1670 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 25, 1970).
186. See 24 KEISH5 1670 (finding a conspiracy by husband and wife to possess gun,
where investigator told each spouse that the other had confessed, and may have hinted that
only one would be punished for the crime).
187. See Sagawa, supra note 178, at 127-128.
188. See Asada, supra note 178, at 54.
189. 57 KEISH5 507 (Sup. Ct., May 1, 2003) (acknowledging that the defendant, who is
the boss of an organized crime group (boryokudan), shall be criminally liable as a co-principal
for the conspiracy of his bodyguards to possess firearms) (Adapted from English translation
by the Judicial Research Foundation); Yukako, supra note 178, at 126-28.
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boryokudan,"o was criminally liable in a joint principal conspiracy with
his bodyguards to possess handguns.'9 The defendant was protected by
bodyguards from a related gang called "S.W.A.T. members" while visit-
ing Tokyo.192 He never directly ordered weapons to be carried, nor did he
have specific knowledge about the weapons.'93 However, he was aware
of the gun possession in general, benefited from it, and had the power to
stop it. 94 This was sufficient for the court to find an implicit understand-
ing and joint principal conspirator liability. 9' A conspiracy existed
between the defendant, five "S.W.A.T. member" bodyguards, and three
other b~ryokudan members who were involved in controlling the body-
guards.
196
B. Police Practice and Criminal Procedure
In addition to the substantive criminal laws discussed in section A,
above, Japan's police practices and criminal procedure are a basis for
concern for critics of Japan's conspiracy bills, who fear that insufficient
procedural protections will result in abuse of a conspiracy law.'97 Japan's
national police force has been accused of oppression of liberal elements
in society.' 98 Although there have been occasional direct confrontations
190. Boryokudan, literally "violent groups," are the Japanese mafia, also known as yakuza.
See Frank EY Huang & Michael S. Vaughn, A Descriptive Analysis of Japanese Organized
Crime: The Boryokudanfrom 1945 to 1988, 2 INT'L CRIM. JUST. REV. 19, 19 (1992).
191. See 57 KEISHa 507 (Sup. Ct., May 1, 2003).
192. See 57 KEISHdI 507 (Sup. Ct., May 1, 2003).
193. See 57 KEISHU 507 (Sup. Ct., May 1, 2003).
194. See 57 KEIsHui 507 (Sup. Ct., May 1, 2003); see also Asada, supra note 178, at 54;
KAIDO & HOSAKA, supra note 56.
195. Asada, supra note 178, at 54.
196. See 57 KEISHa 507 (Sup. Ct., May 1, 2003)
197. See Shinya, supra note 141, at 60 (discussing conspiracy laws and Japan's Security
Police, a special unit charged with keeping the public order in Japan); NIHON BENGOSHI REN-
GOKAI [JAPAN FED'N OF BAR Ass'NS], supra note 59; see also Jennifer Granick, Peace and
Privacy in the Pacific, WIRED, Aug. 2, 2006 (discussing arbitrary use of trespassing laws
against pacifists protesting against the government).
198. See L. CRAIG PARKER, JR., THE JAPANESE POLICE SYSTEM TODAY: AN AMERICAN
PERSPECTIVE 40-41 (1984); Walter Ames, POLICE AND COMMUNITY IN JAPAN 2-48 (1980)
reprinted in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 46, at 468 (noting that security police,
a special police unit charged with maintaining public order, monitors groups that are "per-
ceived as threats to the public security and political status quo."). But see David H. Bayley,
FORCES OF ORDER: POLICE BEHAVIOR IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES ch.2 (1976) re-
printed in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 46, at 438 (stating that Japanese Police
are professional and well-respected).
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between protestors and police,' 99 of far greater concern to critics is dis-
criminatory application of a conspiracy law as a tool of oppression."o
Japanese police investigators have the potential to abuse a conspir-
acy law because they can control criminal suspects for long periods of
time, and use this time to extract confessions that will be considered by a
judge in assessing the suspect's guilt.20' With the cooperation of prosecu-
tors2 02 suspects may be detained in police custody for up to twenty-three
days with limited access" 3 to counsel. 204 This practice has been criticized
as violating international standards, but has been repeatedly upheld by
Japan's courts.2 The suspect is not permitted to have counsel present,
even during interrogation,2 7 and must submit to questioning that can
last "all day and on occasion late into the evening" 200 throughout the
199. PARKER, supra note 198, at 196 (noting that a student activist reports being
"shocked by the police behavior" where fellow activists were "shoved down by police, and
their glasses knocked off").
200. See NIHON BENGOSHI RENGOKAI [JAPAN FED'N OF BAR Ass'NS], supra note 59
(expressing concern about use of conspiracy law against labor and political movements);
Granick, supra note 197 (discussing arbitrary use of trespassing laws against pacifists protest-
ing against the government). See also Walter L. Ames, The Japanese Police: A General
Survey, 2 POLICE STUD. INT'L REV. POLICE DEv. 6, 7-8 (1980) (community boards ineffec-
tive, no local financial control of internal security operations, and no local government
administrative ties to local police stations).
201. See NIHON BENGOSHI RENGOKAI [JAPAN FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS], supra
note 47, at para. 205-07 (taking the position that "there exists a culture of tolerance of the use
of violence by law enforcement officials, for the sake of obtaining confessions"). See Daniel
H. Foote, Confessions and the Right to Silence in Japan, 21 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 415,
415-17 and 438-45 and 455-462 (1991).
202. See Foote, supra note 201, 430 n.88, 431 (1991) (noting prosecutors requested
police detention for an initial 10-day period in over 85% of cases, and requested an additional
10-day extension in over one third of cases). For further explanation, see Symposium on
Prosecuting Transnational Crimes: Cross-Cultural Insights for the Former Soviet Union, 27
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 1, 34 (2000), for a discussion of a similar system in Russia and
Ukraine that notes the lack of standards in prosecutor decisions to detain.
203. See Foote, supra note 201, 432-33 (stating that defense counsel typically needs
permission from prosecutors to meet with their client, with the average number of meetings
during the 20-day detention period being two to five 15-minute meetings).
204. YuJI IWASAWA, INTERNATIONAL LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND JAPANESE LAW: THE
IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON JAPANESE LAW 260-61 (Clarendon Press 1998) (noting
the 72 hour initial detention, then 10 additional days in police custody with a judge's warrant,
with a possible 10 day extension upon request of the prosecutor). See Foote, supra note 201,
at 423, for an analogous Meiji-era practice of holding suspects to extract a confession prior to
submitting a case to the supervising judicial authority.
205. IWASAWA, supra note 204, at 262 n.53 (collecting authorities); see Foote, supra note
201, at 417; NIHON BENGOSHI RENGOKAI [JAPAN FED'N OF BAR Ass'NS], supra note 47, at
para. 227 (noting that the "Japanese government was formally notified by the Human Rights
Committee that the two confinement bills violated ICCPR [an international standard] because
of the daiyo kangoku [literally "substitute prison"-holding the suspects under police custody
instead of at a jail or other non-police facility] system...
206. See, e.g., 17 KEISHU 1795.
207. Foote, supra note 201, at 432-34.
208. Foote, supra note 201, at 431.
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twenty-three day period. 209 An additional twenty-three days can be added
on a separate charge."0 During this time, police control the suspect's en-
vironment2' and work to extract a confession.2 1 These tactics sometimes




Once in court, procedural protections do not effectively prevent theS 214
use of a suspect's confession. Although police must warn a suspect of
his or her right to not answer questions, the warning may be delayed and
a statement made prior to receiving this warning is still admissible as
evidence against him or her.215 In general, a defendant's hearsay state-
ment made prior to trial can also be admitted if it contains damaging
admissions.216 Although the Japanese Constitution prohibits the admis-
sion into evidence of confessions obtained "under compulsion, torture or
threat, or after prolonged arrest or detention," 217 courts are reluctant to
exclude confessions for procedural defects.2 8 Indeed, there are few rigid
evidence rules, as cases are decided by judges, not juries.2 9 Corrobora-
209. Foote, supra note 201, at 430. For further explanation, see details of the difficult
conditions in which detainees are kept, as described in NIHON BENGOSHI RENGOKAI [JAPAN
FED'N OF BAR Ass'NS], JIYUKEN KIYAKU: TOWARERU NIHON NO JINKEN [CIVIL LIBERTIES
INQUIRY: HUMAN RIGHTS IN JAPAN] (1993), available at http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/ja/
humanrights-library/treatylibertyjreport-3rdjfba.html# 1-2-3.
210. See IWASAWA, supra note 204, at 261; Foote, supra note 201, 440 n.133 (noting one
case in which the suspect was re-arrested for fourteen different crimes, and thereby was de-
tained in mostly police custody for almost three years). See, e.g., SETSUO MIYAZAWA,
POLICING IN JAPAN: A STUDY IN MAKING CRIME 20--25, 67-88 (1992), reprinted in THE
JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 46, at 482.
211. Cf DAVID T. JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE 89, 97-104, 179-181, 215-
19, 245-48 (2002) reprinted in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 46, at 451 (relating
the tale of Gary, a 24-yr-old Australian, who after four months of detention and four weeks of
interrogation had lost 55 pounds and whose "toes of both feet were numb with frostbite
caused by exposure to the air in his unheated cell.").
212. See IwASAwA, supra note 204, at 261.
213. See SETSUO, supra note 210, at 475 (making of a false confession to acting alone in
an arson where suspect actually played only a minor role upon police questioning). NIHON
BENGOSHI RENGOKAI [JAPAN FED'N OF BAR Ass'NS], supra note 47, at para. 180-83 (noting
that this system produces "false charges" and "forced confessions," noting that there is "no
suitable check functions" on the police, and characterizing the flaws of the system as resulting
in "human rights violations").
214. See generally Foote, supra note 201.
215. See Foote, supra note 20 1, at 434-35.
216. See ODA, supra note 155, at 428.
217. See KENP6, art. 38, para. 2.
218. MIYAZAWA, supra note 210, at 475; RAMSEYER & NAKAZATO, supra note 158, at
168 n.40 ("Should they [the police] make an illegal arrest, however, that illegality itself will
not necessarily bar any evidence or confession obtained").
219. SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, OUTLINE OF A CIVIL TRIAL IN JAPAN,
http://www.courts.jp.gov, translated and reprinted in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra
note 46, at 180.
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tion for any confession is constitutionally required, 2 as the ConstitutionS 221
forbids punishment or conviction solely based on a confession. How-
ever, the concern in conspiracy cases is that one conspirator's confession
might be admitted against other conspirators, thus basically avoiding the
constitutional corroboration requirement.
22 2
C. Criticisms of a Criminal Conspiracy Law
The conspiracy bill has met with protest and sparked considerable
debate.2 3 Three substantive points are debated. 4 First is whether the
conspiracy bill is truly necessary for ratification of CATOC.2 2 A second
area of debate is the scope of criminal liability and police investigation
that will result from a conspiracy law. 6 In particular, the possibility of
abuse of the law by police is a concern. 7 Finally, the motives behind the
bill are debated. 8
As the debate regarding the conspiracy bill is taking place across a
wide spectrum of Japanese society, criticism of the conspiracy bill is
sometimes extreme or poorly considered.229 Opponents of Japan's pro-
posed criminal conspiracy law sometimes conflate issues of proof with
220. Supra note 202, at 6-7 (arguing that the requirement that confessions be corrobo-
rated is present in other European legal systems).
221. See KENP6, art. 38, para. 3 (explaining there may be no conviction solely based on
confession).
222. See Shinya, supra note 141, at 56, 60 ;see also 12 KEISHO 1718, summary para. 7
(Sup. Ct., May 28, 1958) (commenting that the use of joint-principle conspirators' statements
against each other has happened).
223. See, e.g., Activists protest over plan to introduce conspiracy law, JAPAN ECONOMIC
NEWSWIRE, October 17, 2006 (voicing concern about freedom of speech); P.E.N. club ex-
presses opposition to conspiracy bill, JAPAN ECONOMIC NEWSWIRE, May 15, 2006; Civic
groups oppose conspiracy bill prior to Diet deliberations, JAPAN ECONOMIC NEWSWIRE, April
19, 2006; Tokyo Shimbun wins JCJ grand prize for conspiracy features JAPAN ECONOMIC
NEWSWIRE, July 27, 2006 (extensive coverage of conspiracy issue due to popular concern);
Just contemplating crime may soon be punishable, THE JAPAN TIMES, January 3, 2004 (noting
lawyer's concerns that a conspiracy law might be used against labor unions, and noting that
"the federation also challenged the government's basis for pushing the legislation-the legiti-
macy of the U.N. convention against transnational organized crime, noting it was passed
without through examination of its human rights ramifications"); NICHIBENREN HA KYOBOZAI
NI HANTAI SHIMASU [JAPAN FED'N OF BAR Ass'NS OPPOSES CONSPIRACY LAW], supra note
137; NIHON BENGOSHI RENG6KAI [JAPAN FED'N OF BAR Ass'NS], supra note 59; KAIDo &
HOSAKA, supra note 56; YAPPARI ABANAI zo! KY6B6ZAI (Kinohana 2006); Tokushu: "Kydb5-
zai" wo takakuteki, hinannteki ni kento suru, H6RITSU JIH6, Sept. 2006, 4-62.
224. See Tokushu, supra note 223 (addressing the substantive points).
225. See Tokushu, supra note 223, at 13.
226. See Tokushu, supra note 223, at 20.
227. See Tokushu, supra note 223, at 56.
228. See Tokushu, supra note 223, at 4.
229. See Editorial, supra note 95.
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substantive conspiracy law.23° Critics ignore the bills' limitations to seri-
ous crimes and the requirement of an overt act, discussing nightmare
scenarios which are outside of the scope of application of the conspiracy
bill."' Some citizen groups even fear that failure to intervene to stop a
friend from assaulting someone would be punishable as a conspiracy.
232
S231
Also, although inchoate crimes are well-established in the penal code,
the inchoate nature of conspiracy looms large for some critics.3
This misunderstanding of the conspiracy bill may be a result from
generally unfavorable media coverage of issues related to criminal con-
spiracy law. 235 For example, the story of one Japanese citizen arrested for
a drug-related conspiracy in the United States and sentenced to two years
imprisonment was turned into a television drama in Japan.236 By contrast,
prior to successfully implemented anti-smoking legislation, Japanese
saw first-hand the benefits of anti-smoking laws when visiting such
places as Hawaii, California, and New York . 7
On a substantive level, a major point of debate is whether the con-
spiracy bill is required by CATOC. 238 Opponents claim that the bill is
230. See Remarks of Fukushima Mizuho, chair of Social Democratic Party of Japan,
Japan Diet House of Councilors session of 5/18/2006, http://www.mizuhoto.org/Ol/
04back n/060518.html ("Without having actually done anything, a person can be sentenced,
with respect to 620 different criminal offenses, just on the basis of something they have agreed
to or on the basis of something they have said. How do you present findings in court about
something that that you did not actually do? ... A person can be convicted of a criminal of-
fense for trying to drive up stock value by making their company's data look better, even if
they never actually carried out any actions. In terms of contemporary criminal law, I don't
know how you can substantiate this kind of allegation in court.").
231. Lawmakers Split on Time Line for Criminalizing Conspiracy, DAILY YOMIURI, (Ja-
pan) May 2, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 14764411 (relaying a citizen group's fears that
telling someone in a pub "I'm going to punch that guy for what he did to me" could result in a
conspiracy charge).
232. See id.
233. See KEIH6 art. 43-44.
234. E.g., ABANAI zo! KY6B6ZAI (Ogura Toshimaru & Kaido Yuuchi eds., Kinohanasha
2006); NIHON BENGOSHI RENG6KAI [JAPAN FED'N OF BAR Ass'NS], supra note 59, at 3 (con-
sidering conspiracy as a thought crime, as the point of punishment is moved far earlier in the
crime).
235. See e.g., Wakabayashi Manami, "Purizun Garu" wo enshutsu: Jijitu no motsu chi-
kara hikidasu [Shooting "Prison Girl:" Power of a True Story], YOMIURI SHINBUN, Apr. 10
2006. For an example of other media presentations, see Oded Lowerheim, Transnational
Criminal Organizations and Security: The Case Against Inflating the Threat, 57 Int'l J. 513
(2002).
236. See Manami, supra note 236 (describing the arrest and sentencing of a Japanese
exchange student for a drug-related conspiracy charge, and plans to create a television drama
based on the true story).
237. Eric A. Feldman, The Culture of Legal Change: A Case Study of Tobacco Control in
Twenty-First Century Japan, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 743,802 (2006).
238. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE SUMMARY, supra note 44; Ministry of Justice Website,
http://www.moj.go.jp/KEUII/keiji35-l.html; Kiriyama Takanobu, Kokusai soshiki hanzai b6shi
jy~yaku no hijyun to kokunai h6ka no kadai [The Subject of CATOC Ratification and Domestic
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unnecessary because Japan's current criminal laws, such as the similar
judicially-developed doctrine of joint principal conspiracy, already meet
the requirements of CATOC. 2 9 Proponents of the bill note that CATOC
requires that a conspiracy be made a crime through explicit legislativeS 240
action to create a crime conforming to the treaty's requirements. Op-
ponents counter that Japan need not strictly adhere to this requirement,
and may proceed to ratify the convention without making any changes.24'
It is true that although CATOC requires adherence to its terms, there are
no particular penalties for failure to do so.24 2
Proponents of the bill also advocate it as a practical necessity, since
group crime continues to increase in Japan.2 3 Crime by foreign groups
and groups with international ties taking place inside of Japan is increas-
ing.2 4 Indeed, the general rise in transnational crime is the very reason
for the adoption of CATOC,245 because weakness in any one country's
Law Implementation], H6RITSU JIH6, Sept. 2006, 13, at 13-14; see Abe Urges Early Diet Pas-
sage of Bill on Anti-organized Crime Law, KYoDo NEWS SERVICE, (Japan) Jan. 19, 2007, at 1,
available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-mOXPQ/is-2007_Jan_22/ai-nl7136580/print.
239. See NICHIBENREN HA KY6BOZAI NI HANTAI SHIMASU [JAPAN FEDERATION OF BAR
ASSOCIATIONS OPPOSES CONSPIRACY LAW], supra note 137 (website text noting that CATOC
compliance can be accomplished without the conspiracy bill based on current law); see also
KAIDO & HOSAKA, supra note 56, at 10; Ministry of Justice Website, supra note 239.
240. See Kiriyama, supra note 238, at 13. See CATOC Legislative Guide, supra note 41,
at 23; U.N. Gen. Assembly, Ad Hoc Comm. On Elaboration of Convention Against Transnat'l
Organized Crime, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime on the Work of Its First to Eleventh Sessions, Adden-
dum, Interpretative Notes for the Official Records (travaux pr~paratoires) of the Negotiation
of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols
Thereto, para. 9, U.N. Doc. A/55/383/Add.l (Nov. 2, 2000).
241. See NIHON BENGOSHI RENG6KAI [JAPAN FED'N OF BAR Ass'NS], KY6B36ZAI SHIN-
SETSU NI KAN SURU IKENSHO [OPINION PAPER ON THE NEW CONSPIRACY BILL] 5 (Sept. 14,
2006), http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/ja/opinion/report/data/060914.pdf (noting that Saint
Christopher and Nevis ratified CATOC after creating a domestic crime of conspiracy which
included as an element of the crime that it must be transnational. CATOC explicitly requires
that there be no transnational element to the crime of conspiracy due to the difficulty of prov-
ing such a crime. See infra note 252. The article seems to imply that Japan may thus also
ratify CATOC without Japan's dometic law being in strict compliance.).
242. See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transna-
tional Organized Crime, Third Session, Vienna, Austria Oct. 9-18, 2006, Draft Report, para.
34, U.N. Doc. CTOC/COP/2006/L.I (Oct. 13, 2006) (regarding this and other challenges
hindering full implementation by member states).
243. ALUMNI ASS'N FOR NAT'L POLICE ACAD., CRIMES IN JAPAN IN 2005 22 (Nat'l Po-
lice Acad. ed., 2006), http://www.npa.go.jp/english/seisaku5/200612l1 .pdf.
244. See PETER B. E. HILL, THE JAPANESE MAFIA: YAKUZA, LAW, AND THE STATE 144
(2003) (describing the increase in international yakuza activity).
245. See The Secretary-General, United Nations Convention Against Transnational Or-
ganized Crime and the Protocols Thereto, delivered to the Commission on Crime Prevention
and Social Justice, para. 62, U.N. Doc. E/CN.15/2006/8 (Mar. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Int'l
Cooperation]; The Secretary-General of the Congress, Eleventh United Nations Congress on
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Fifty years of United Nations congresses on crime
prevention and criminal justice: past accomplishments and future prospects, Bangkok, Apr.
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criminal law or enforcement capability "translates itself into an overall
weakness in the international regime of criminal justice cooperation, '46
and because group criminal activity reduces the personal liberties of citi-
zens. 247 Proponents also note that other countries have taken more
aggressive or expansive measures to combat transnational crime.4 8
The scope of criminal liability under the proposed conspiracy law is
another major point of contention. 249 The conspiracy bill's requirement of
250
some connection to an organization is attacked as vague. In response to
the perceived vagueness of the conspiracy bill's organizational limita-
tion, critics recommend adding provisions to the bill that would limit its
application to international criminal groups in order to protect labor and
domestic government groups from persecution.25' CATOC specifically
forbids such limitations, as proving such additional elements of a con-
18-25, 2005, Fifty Years of United Nations Congresses on Crime Prevention and Criminal
Justice: Past Accomplishments and Future Prospects, para. 54, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.203/15
(Mar. 24, 2005)(noting that serious crime is a threat to the maintenance of the rule of law).
246. Yvon Dandurand, STRATEGIES AND PRACTICAL MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN THE
CAPACITY OF PROSECUTION SERVICES IN DEALING WITH TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME,
TERRORISM AND CORRUPTION para. 3 (Int'l Ctr. for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice
Policy, Working Paper II, 2005). See also Conspiracy of Dunces Thwarts Conspiracy Bill,
supra note 94.
247. See CATOC Legislative Guide, supra note 41, at 6 ("Political processes, democratic
institutions, social programs, economic development, and human rights are all undermined by
the wealth and influence organized criminal groups can exercise.").
248. See e.g., Kinoshita Satoshi, Kenpo to tero taisaku rippo [The Constitution and Anti-
terrorism Legislation], H6RITSU JIHO, Sept. 2006, 6, at 7 (2006) (discussing the UK Preven-
tion of Terrorism Act of 2005 and its "control orders" restricting the liberties of suspected
citizens). See Int'l Cooperation, supra note 246, para. 24 (member of UNODC chaired session
on "Fruits of the poisoned tree: the admission of illegally obtained evidence in criminal pro-
ceedings post 9/11" at the eighth Transnational Crime Conference); CATOC Legislative
Guide, supra note 41, at 28 (noting that Chile has criminalized the failure to report the activi-
ties of a criminal organization to the authorities).
249. NICHIBENREN HA KYOBOZAI WO HANTAI SHIMASU [JAPAN FEDERATION OF BAR
ASSOCIATIONS OPPOSES CONSPIRACY LAW], supra note 138.
250. See KAiDO & HOSAKA, supra note 56, at 10, 25-35. See Lawmakers Split on ime
Line for Criminalizing Conspiracy, DAILY YOMIURI, May 2, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR
14764411; LDP Panel Calls for Major Revision of Conspiracy Bill, DAILY YOMIURI, Feb. 6,
2007, available at 2007 WLNR 5011542;. But see Kinoshita, supra note 248, at 6 (discussing
the difficulty of defining terrorism).
251. See Asada, supra note 179, at 50 (recommending that being "international" or being
an organized crime group be an element of the crime, in order to protect labor and other do-
mestic groups); Lawmakers Split on Time Line for Criminalizing Conspiracy, DAILY YOMIURI,
supra note 251 (proposal to limit applicability to "international crimes by organized crime
groups"); Editorial, Flawed Crime Bill Threatens Rights, THE JAPAN TIMES, Aug. 3 2005
(demanding that the bill be revised to only cover "transnational crimes by criminal organiza-
tions"). For an example of Japanese legislation with a specific definition of a criminal
organization, see HILL, supra note 245, at 158-59 (giving the specific definition of a b6ryoku-
dan group in Japan's Anti-Organized Crime Act).
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spiracy crime is cumbersome, and lack of uniformity reduces opportuni-
ties for extradition of transnational criminals.252
Another attack on the vagueness of the conspiracy bills focuses on
the type of act required to trigger liability.53 The Ministry of Justice in-
terprets the terse language used in the original conspiracy bill to provide
essentially the same protections as does the overt act requirement in
American conspiracy law.254 But the critics feel that the specific language
added to later versions of the bill to further solidify the act requirement
may not even be considered by Japan's courts as an element of the of-
fense.21 As no bill has been adopted, which implementation will prevail
in Japan's courts is unclear.
25 6
The conspiracy bill's "serious crimes" limitation is also attacked as
overly expansive."7 Critics also point out that the limitation of conspir-
acy to "serious crimes" is a mild limitation, as over 600 crimes qualify
under the definition in Japan.258 Yet CATOC specifies the definition of
serious crime.259 CATOC's purpose of enabling effective international
cooperation against organized crime, through such activities as extradi-
tion, is helped by uniformity.26 Also, a much larger number of crimes
qualify as serious crimes in countries such as the United States. 6'
252. See CATOC Legislative Guide, supra note 41, at 19 ("... drafters must not include
[these elements] in the definition of domestic offenses ... any requirements of transnationality
or organized criminal group involvement would unnecessarily complicate and hamper law
enforcement. . . . transnationality must not be an element at the domestic level."); see also
Diane Marie Amann, Spotting Money Launderers: A Better Way to Fight Organized Crime?,
27 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 199, 199 (2000) ("Proving the existence of a criminal or-
ganization can be a complex and cumbersome task.").
253. See NIHON BENGOSHI RENG6KAI [JAPAN FED'N OF BAR Ass'NS], supra note 59, at
14.
254. See NIHON BENGOSHI RENG6KAI [JAPAN FED'N OF BAR Ass'NS], supra note 59, at
15.
255. See NIHON BENGOSHI RENGOKAI [JAPAN FED'N OF BAR Ass'NS], supra note 59, at
15-16 (even LDP members have reached this conclusion); see Kobayakawa, supra note 6, at
42; Ito, supra note 8, at 78.
256. See Nihon Bengoshi Rengokai [Japan Fed'n of Bar Ass'ns] supra note 42 (noting
uncertainty of the proposals' scope).
257. See NIHON BENGOSHI RENG6KAI [JAPAN FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS],
supra note 242, at 3; NICHIBENREN WA KYOBOZAI WO HANTAI SHIMASU [JAPAN BAR FEDERA-
TION OPPOSES CONSPIRACY LAW], supra note 137.
258. NIHON BENGOSHI RENG6KAI [JAPAN FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS], supra
note 242, at 3.
259. See CATOC, supra note 1, art. 2(b).
260. See CATOC, supra note 1, art. 1; see also CATOC Legislative Guide, supra note 41,
at para. 17.
261. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The
Problem is Uniformity, not Disparity, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 857, 873 (1992) (noting the
harsh minimum sentences under federal guidelines for drug and weapons offenses); Gerald F
Uelmen, Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Cure Worse Than the Disease, 29 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 899, 901 (1992).
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In addition to the scope of criminal liability, the scope of investiga-
tion and enforcement of a conspiracy crime is a concern of critics. 262 The
combination of a conspiracy crime and the use of wiretapping and other
surveillance could be particularly dangerous.263 An adverse impact on the
freedom of speech is of particular concern.264 It is true that there have
been abuses of wiretapping by Japanese police 265 and that citizen control
of police is limited.266 Evidentiary rules offer limited protection, as there
is no explicit requirement that co-conspirators' statements must be made
in furtherance of the conspiracy in order to be admissible at trial.267 The
high conviction rate in Japan and limited number of lawyers available to
defend the accused are cause for additional concern.
However, wiretapping by police is constrained by several statutory
safeguards that will remain in place in a conspiracy investigation. 6 9 For
example, "all intercepts must be carried out in the presence of a neutral
observer," and a recording of the intercepted communication must be
sent to the court that issued the warrant authorizing the intercept. 270 Law
enforcement officials point out that, in the context of investigations
against organized crime groups, the very combination of wiretapping
with the ability to charge conspiracy is one of the few weapons available
262. NIHON BENGOSHI RENG6KAI [JAPAN FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS], supra
note 59, at 29.
263. CHOKANSHI SHAKAI TO JIYU-KYOB6ZAI KAO NINSHO SHISUTEMU JYUKI NETTO WO
TO [OBSERVATION SOCIETY AND FREEDOM-CONSPIRACY, FACE RECOGNITION SYSTEMS, AND
THE JUKU NETWORK] (Tajima Yasuhiko & Saitou Takao eds., Kadensha 2006); Takada, supra
note 70, at 5; CHOKANSHISHAKAI TO JIYU - KY6BOZAI, KAONINSHO SHISUTEMU, JYUKINETTO
wo TOU, supra (expressing concern about Japan as an "observation society"). See CRIMES IN
JAPAN IN 2005, supra note 244, at 16 (identifying the first use of wiretapping in the investiga-
tion of a conspiracy murder case).
264. See Saitou Takao & Sawada Tatsuo, "Chian kokka" kyohi sengen-"Ky6b6zai" ga
yatte kuru ["Public Order Country" Communication Denial-"Conspiracy" is Coming] (Aki-
fumisha 2005); Tony McNicol, Journalists Protest Conspiracy Law, JAPAN MEDIA REVIEW
(July 12, 2006), http://www.japanmediareview.com/japan/stories/060712mcnicol; David
McNeill, Politics of Peace, AsIAMEDIA.
265. See Mark D. West, Prosecution Review Commissions: Japan's Answer to the Prob-
lem of Prosecutorial Discretion, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 684, 700 (1992).
266. Ames, supra note 200, at 7-8.
267. See Kobayakawa, supra note 6, at 42 (discussing possible application of American
evidentiary rules to Japan's criminal law).
268. See JOHN 0. HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE
PARADOX ch.6 (1991), reprinted in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 46, at 445 (not-
ing conviction rate drops to 90% if uncontested guilt cases are removed). NIHON BENGOSHI
RENGOKAI [JAPAN FED'N OF BAR ASS'NS], supra note 47, at para. 88 ("In practice, the vast
majority of suspects do not benefit from legal counsel (There are not even any official statis-
tics on this. It is estimated that of all suspects, around 10% have lawyers.)"); Kazuhiro
Yonemoto, The Shimane Bar Association: All Twenty-One Members Strong, 25 LAW IN JAPAN
115 (1995), reprinted in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 46, at 87-96.
269. See HILL, supra note 245, at 260.
270. HILL, supra note 245, at 260.
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against the leadership of such organizations who are not otherwise di-
rectly involved in criminal acts.27' One possible response to critics'
concerns in Japan would be to codify a specific evidentiary rule applica-
ble to conspiracies, similar to the hearsay rule related to conspiracy in
the United States.
A final substantive point of debate regarding the conspiracy bill is
the true motivation behind it.27 The LDP has been accused of using
CATOC as an excuse to impose a criminal conspiracy law.274 Since con-
servative political parties, the generally conservative police 2 7 and public
prosecutors have generally been considered strong supporters of
CATOC, 276 protestors see a conspiracy law as part of a general trend to-
ward the right in Japanese society.277 Proponents of the bill do not go
beyond the need to ratify CATOC, the fact that many other countries
both have conspiracy laws and have implemented CATOC, and the need
to fight crime as the motivations behind the conspiracy bill.278
V. CONCLUSION
Japan is one of the few remaining countries without a statutory gen-
eral conspiracy law. After signing CATOC in 2000, Japan may be
obligated to adopt such a law. Conspiracy bills proposed in Japan have
been similar to, and in some ways more limited than, comparable con-
spiracy under the Model Penal Code and common-law conspiracy. Yet
the attempt to criminalize conspiracy in Japan has met great resistance,
271. See Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, April 24-28, 2006,
Measures Against Organized Crime: Statement Submitted by the International Police Associa-
tion, U.N. Doc. E/CN.15/2006/NGO/I (Mar. 29, 2006). See also JOHN EVANS, CRIMINAL
NETWORKS, CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES 2 (July 1994), available at http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/
Publications/Reports/netwks94.pdf.
272. For example, FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) applies in particular to co-conspirators;
see also KADISH, supra note 3, at 677.
273. See Kaido, supra note 72, at 20.
274. See Kaido, supra note 72, at 20.
275. See Ames, supra note 200, at 9; see generally PARKER, supra note 198, at 40-196.
276. See Kobayakawa, supra note 6, at 42. See also U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., 62d plen.
mtg., at 2, 3, U.N. Doc. A/55/PV.62 (Nov. 15, 2000) (giving Japan special mention twice by
the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention against Transna-
tional Organized Crime, once for financial contributions, and once for an active and excellent
delegation); Q& A Related to the Group Crime of Conspiracy, http://www.moj.go.jp/HOUAN/
KYOUBOUZAI/refer06.html (explaining and advocating the bill).
277. NISHIKAWA SHIGENORI & MINAMI NANAMI, KORE KARA SENSO NANTE NAI VO
NE?-JIYU GA FUTU JYA NAKU NARU HI [No MORE WAR FROM HERE ON, RIGHT?-THE DAY
FREEDOM BECOMES THE EXCEPTION] 23-35 (2006).
278. See H6MUSHO [MINISTRY OF JUSTICE], SOSHIKITEKINA HANZAI NO KY6B6ZAI NI
KAN SURU Q&A [Q&A RELATED TO THE GROUP CRIME OF CONSPIRACY], available at
http://www.moj.go.jp/HOUAN/KYOUBOUZAI/refer06.html.
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and all proposed bills have failed in the Diet. The necessity, scope, and
motivation behind the conspiracy bill continues to be debated seven
years after adoption of CATOC in Japan. The debate in Japan is a rare
modern discussion in which a wide spectrum of society considers the
need for, and proper scope of, criminal conspiracy law.
